Three scenarios for the Thai government to tackle protests

• In our baseline scenario, the government will try to outlast the protesters through a hybrid strategy of hard-line crackdown and calculated offers of compromise.

• Military crackdown cannot be ruled out, but the grave consequences that would ensue mean that this will be a last resort.

• With the economy foundering amid the pandemic, the protests could bring down the government, but only if their focus shifts from the monarchy.

• The bottom line remains that a genuine and full democratisation will remain off the table as long as the royalist-military alliance endures.

Over the past four months anti-government protests have grown in a leaderless and amorphous fashion, akin to what transpired in Hong Kong in 2019. In this piece, The Economist Intelligence Unit outlines its core forecast for Thailand in the short term and, reflecting the highly uncertain environment, offers two alternative scenarios. Notably, all point to the continued dominance of the royalist-military bloc, as protests have never succeeded in modern Thai history without the support of either the monarch or the army. We continue to believe the most likely outcome to be that protests continue for a prolonged period—weeks or even months—and the level of force involved will escalate before the movement eventually runs out of steam.

Base case: a waiting game

In the coming weeks, the government’s guiding principle will be simply to outlast the protesters until their momentum finally ebbs and fatigue takes over. To get to this point, the government will take a two-pronged approach, dangling the carrot of minor concessions and brandishing the stick of a tough legal crackdown.

The government’s lifting of the state of emergency on October 22nd (after just one week) speaks to its awareness that draconian measures will only inflame the protests. In the immediate term, the government will tolerate the presence of the demonstrators and adopt a conciliatory tone. While it will offer some concessions, such as the release of prisoners or an early election, these will fall well short of the protesters’ demands. The government will not resign or overhaul the 2017 constitution that codifies the considerable powers of the royalist-military establishment. The concessions will not be intended for the hard-core protesters but for the public, as the government pushes the narrative that the demonstrators are monarchy-loathing extremists. We expect the protesters to dismiss the concessions after a drawn-out process, following which the government will enact a rapid and mostly bloodless clearance operation.

Meanwhile, the government will keep up the pressure on protesters by raising the cost of involvement in the demonstrations, before and after the clearance. High-profile protesters will be arrested and charged, while universities and large companies will be pressured to expel or dismiss those who refuse to lay low after initial police warnings. Pro-opposition media will experience greater harassment and mandatory censorship as the government seeks to stem flows of protest-related information.

On the students’ side, barring a sudden and unprovoked police attack, or a sharp deterioration of the health and economic crisis amid the pandemic, they are unlikely to attract more than 100,000 on a regular basis. It should be noted that the number of protesters has remained quite stable but still not exceeded 50,000 despite months of mobilisation.

After an extended impasse and exasperation on the part of the protesters at token concessions, an escalation to direct action may appear to be the only avenue left for some protesters. The use of force by the police will be disproportionate in this case, but will not rise to the level of indiscriminate killing. Combined with accumulating fatigue and milestone events, such as a snap election, the movement will ultimately peter out.

First alternative scenario: military crackdown

In addition to our base case, it is worthwhile to outline two alternative scenarios that would carry far-reaching consequences. The military will certainly resort to brutal suppression should its power come under imminent threat. It has done so before, including in 1976, 1992 and 2010, when dozens of activists were killed and many more tortured. That said, this would only materialise if certain strict conditions are met, as the royalist-military bloc would stand to pay a dear price.

The protests would have to attract growing support while retaining an unrelenting emphasis on reform of the monarchy and expulsion of military influence from politics. This would preclude any compromise being struck to defuse the situation. Meanwhile, protesters will have taken more radical action that has a direct and immediate impact on the day-to-day function of government, such as prolonged occupation of key buildings. With the police force either unable or unwilling to clear protesters, the military would feel the need to intervene with royal backing. In this case, the odds of a return to outright military rule, as occurred following the 1976 massacre, will increase significantly.

Second alternative scenario: the government is sacrificed

Our second alternative scenario sees the protestors topple the government. We think that it is all but impossible for the protestors to curb the authority of the monarch, but there is a greater chance of them scaring the establishment into sacrificing the current government. For this scenario to materialise, it would require the protests to swell to include more moderate voices. The fertile soil of economic hardship amid the pandemic has made a sudden and massive growth of protests a real possibility. However, should a bigger group of less ideologically driven citizens join the demonstrations, the demands will likely shift focus to corruption and the incompetence of the military-aligned government. The king and part of the military could opt to remove the prime minister, call new elections and undertake limited constitutional reforms that expand the democratic franchise again, for instance by allowing for a partially elected upper house.

Economy in the crosshairs

The protests could not have come at a worse time for the government, as it is already struggling to support economic recovery amid the pandemic. In our baseline scenario, the economy will emerge relatively unscathed, although daily protests, culminating in a bloodless clearance operation in mid-2021, could have a minor impact on tourism, owing to the negative media coverage and travel alerts. Other sectors and the appetite of foreign investors will remain largely intact. For our second alternative scenario, the uncertainty in this case will hinge more on the election results, as well as the policy orientation of the new government.

The worst-case scenario, which could see an expected recovery fizzle out, will come to pass should the military put down the protests in brutal fashion. A repeat of the massacre in 1976 or days of violent street warfare will almost certainly draw international sanction. In this case, the ongoing free-trade negotiations with the EU will be the first casualty, followed by sanctions against the military and even the king. Although not directly impeding foreign businesses, this will deter some risk-averse investors. More significantly, the tourism sector will suffer immediate and lasting damage as harrowing images circulate on the Internet. In the longer term, the reputational damage to the already weakened monarchy would further jeopardise the royalist-military bloc’s continued dominance over Thai political life, while its enviable position as an ally of both China and the West could come under strain. Such heavy costs inform our view that the military will take a more restrained approach, in line with our baseline scenario.