Afghanistan: what next?

• There is little reason to believe that the Taliban will not implement the extremely harsh ruling style they adopted when last in power, between 1996 and 2001.

• We see the risk of an Afghan civil war as low and, if the Taliban cement their control without widely resorting to violence, economic activity may hold up. Vital international assistance will be pared back, however, leading to a likely rise in opium exports.

• China and Russia may play an enhanced role in Afghanistan, driven by their security concerns. However, this will not necessarily preclude the possibility that terrorist groups will develop a stronger presence in the country.

When the US decided to remove its forces from Afghanistan, the potential for a Taliban takeover was certainly a known risk; we had expected the previous Afghan government to collapse. Still, the speed at which it happened came as a surprise. It is most likely that Taliban forces had been negotiating the surrender of local government and military leaders far in advance, waiting for the right time. It is worth remembering that senior military officers and local government leaders are older and have been through challenging transitions before, and so might see the changing of loyalties as key to their survival.

The defence of the country required both willingness and skill, and it seems that the Afghan National Army had neither. Despite tens of billions of US dollars in direct international aid to the military, it proved difficult either to develop a strong sense of commitment to the nation or to reduce their dependence upon foreign military support. The army was never able to step up to the task at hand; it lacked strong leadership and ended up with a corrupt organisation, largely unskilled and unmotivated. Those soldiers and officers who truly were devoted to their country and who developed the skills they needed were let down by their leadership, and many now face potential reprisals from the new government.

What next for Afghanistan?

Daily life in Afghanistan, which has always been difficult, is likely to change for the worse for many people. When the Taliban came to power 25 years ago they implemented an extraordinarily harsh ruling style that involved denying education to women, carrying out public executions of their opponents and persecuting religious minorities. There is no reason to believe that this time will be any different, and indeed there have been reports in recent weeks that as the Taliban moved into smaller towns, they were returning to their old practices.

One of the biggest challenges to Afghanistan’s economic growth was a resurgence in militant violence since 2020, and that factor may be removed from the equation following the Taliban’s takeover. Agriculture, transport and the economic supply chain all were affected by the violence and could now experience smoother operations.

On the other hand, a likely paring back of international assistance will hurt the outlook for the economy, given that aid flows financed the majority of the previous government’s budget. A full-scale civil war is not currently expected, but would clearly lead to a scaling-back of Afghanistan’s economic prospects.

High global food prices will support demand for Afghanistan’s dried fruit—the country’s staple export. Trade routes across Afghanistan between Pakistan and Central Asia will continue to develop, supporting spending on transport construction. Work will probably continue on a number of projects, including a power transmission cable that will run from Tajikistan to Pakistan when it is completed in 2022.

Looking globally, the return of the Taliban is likely to lead to an increase in opium exports from Afghanistan. Even with foreign assistance designed to reduce the drug trade, the UN estimated that there was a 37% increase in the amount of land used for growing poppies in 2020. Assuming that assistance will end with the departure of foreign governments and some private groups, we should expect to see a greater emphasis on that particular cash crop.

Covid-19 is poised to have a long-term effect on the country. Afghanistan received more than 3m vials of the Johnson & Johnson (US) single-dose vaccine in July, through the WHO-led COVAX Facility, supplementing earlier deliveries of around 1.7m doses from China, India and COVAX. The vaccination programme could be disrupted by the political turmoil, however; we believe that it will be near the end of 2024 before the country vaccinates more than 60% of its 38m population. The Taliban will depend on foreign aid to continue vaccination, but that aid is in doubt following the takeover.

Key international considerations

The departure of Western diplomats from Afghanistan and uncertainty about future relations with a Taliban government leave a gap that China may have an interest in filling. China has played a smaller role than other countries in Afghanistan’s rebuilding, but it was engaged with the previous government and seems prepared to continue after the takeover. The Chinese embassy is still operating, and if security holds up at a tolerable level, Afghanistan could host China-funded infrastructure projects; the Belt and Road Initiative has been a topic of discussion, but no projects have materialised yet.

The potential refugee crisis could affect regional relations. Turkey, for example, which currently has around 120,000 Afghan refugees, is already accusing Iran of moving refugees toward the Turkey-Iran border to encourage them to move on. As countries in the West look at how they might absorb more Afghan refugees, they are considering not only the potential economic and social impact, but also the coronavirus-related risks of bringing in large numbers of people from a predominantly unvaccinated country. The EU has already seen divisions between member nations on the issue of refugees, and the new situation is likely to add fuel to that fire.

Of course, the biggest global concern about what’s happening in Afghanistan goes back to the very reason for the 2001 invasion: could Afghanistan once again become a haven for terrorist groups? This is certainly a possibility, although considering how that worked out for the group the last time, the new Taliban leadership might reconsider the issue; it has given assurances that it will not provide a safe haven for terrorist groups. China and Russia are both concerned about the potential for terrorism emanating from Afghanistan, and so the relationship between those countries and the Taliban may serve to reduce that risk. In addition, any return of terrorists to the country might prompt the US and its allies to set up counter-terrorism units.

We monitor the world to help you prepare for what’s ahead. Contact the EIU for more information.