Assassination draws Lebanon further into Israel-Hamas war

What’s happened?

On the evening of January 2nd Salah al‑Arouri, the deputy political bureau chief of Hamas, an Islamist group that controls Gaza, was killed in a targeted attack in Dahiyeh, a suburb of the Lebanese capital, Beirut, and a stronghold of Hizbullah, an Iranian-backed Lebanese Shia group. Six other Hamas members were killed in the incident. The attack was allegedly carried out by the Israeli Air Force. We assess that Mr Arouri’s assassination raises the potential for all‑out conflict between Israel and Hizbullah.

Why does it matter?

Mr Arouri’s assassination, as well those of Hamas military commanders Samir Findi and Azzam al‑Aqraa in the same attack, constitutes the first significant targeted killing of senior Hamas figures abroad since the October 7th attacks that triggered the ongoing Israel-Hamas war. Israel has said that all senior Hamas figures are targets as it seeks to destroy the group’s capabilities, with more yet to come. Hamas has a diffuse and geographically scattered leadership. The deaths of Mr Arouri and Mr Findi will have a particular effect on Hamas’s operations in the West Bank and Lebanon—Mr Arouri oversaw the organisation’s operations in the West Bank and was also responsible for maintaining ties between Hamas and Hizbullah and Iran. Mr Findi was responsible for Hamas’s military operations in Lebanon. However, the implications of the assassination are more far‑reaching and could lead to a regional escalation of the conflict.

So far, Lebanon’s official response has been muted. However, in mid‑2023, as Israel-Hizbullah tensions mounted, Hizbullah’s secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, warned that his organisation would respond militarily to the assassination of any Palestinian, Lebanese, Syrian or Iranian figure on Lebanese soil. So far, escalating fighting between Hizbullah and Israel in southern Lebanon has yet to evolve into a broader, all‑out confrontation in Lebanon or regionally. This is due to a combination of factors, namely US military pressure, international diplomatic pressure, internal Lebanese and Israeli dynamics and an apparent lack of will on Hizbullah’s part. These assassinations put Hizbullah in a difficult position, however. It must respond to save face but needs to calculate whether to do so in a restrained manner, to minimise the chance of all‑out conflict, or in a manner that brings about all‑out conflict.

What next?

The potential for the Israel-Lebanon front to escalate into all‑out conflict has increased substantially following the killings. Iran’s reluctance to become drawn into regional conflict and the heavy burden of a war for both Israel and Lebanon means that on balance we expect an all‑out Israel-Lebanon war to be averted in the short term. However, given Israel’s growing focus on curtailing Hizbullah’s firepower, the medium‑term risks of an Israel-Lebanon war remain high.

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